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Note
Patents and Patients: Who Is the Tragedy of the Anticommons
Impacting and Who Is Bearing the Cost of HighPriced
Biotechnological Research?
Caroline A. Crenshaw*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the scientific and medical worlds continue to research
and develop new therapeutic theories, drugs, diagnostics,
and treatments, the legal world must address concurrent
questions stemming from such research and covering issues
of ownership, privacy, morality, and public policy. One key
issue involves biotechnology patents, a topic of not only
national debate, but also the subject of extensive legal
literature and case law, as well as recent congressional
action aimed at enacting new patent laws. In the ongoing
debate, which has focused on the research roles of major
universities, large pharmaceutical firms, and small, start-up
biotech research firms, a group of America’s most important
medical research facilities—private, non-profit research
hospitals, like the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, MN—have been
ignored.
These private non-profit research hospitals are hybrids of
businesses and academic centers and, because of this, they
are negatively impacted by patent laws in ways that
institutions which have been the focus of recent patent
debates are not. For example, pharmaceutical companies
make money—their sole focus—through high-quality
research and patient test results distributed by the private
institutions. Start-up firms keep development and research
costs down by utilizing the private institutions’ research.
Universities, which would seem most analogous to the
private institutions, have fewer financial concerns than the
non-profit private research centers, since they have a
continual stream of revenue from state appropriations,
*
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federal grants, and large endowments. In addition, sovereign
immunity protects state universities from patent lawsuits.
The non-profit private institutions, by contrast, are stuck in
the middle. These institutions enjoy few research or financial
advantages, but, through their business arms, must patent
all of their discoveries to protect themselves, much as any
pharmaceutical or start-up biotech company would. Most
importantly, these institutions focus primarily on patient
care.
Because of the patent problem, private institutions have
been forced to (1) apply for patents on all of their medical
research breakthroughs, whether major or minor, preventing
physicians and researchers from changing experimental
procedures quickly for individual patients; (2) incur costs in
physician time, legal expenses, and business administration
to apply for and process patents; (3) incur costs to defend
against unwitting patent violations; (4) incur costs of
monitoring and suing violators of their own patents; and (5)
pay high prices for the use of patented material not
developed in-house. Meanwhile, the Mayo Clinic and its
counterparts, for example the Cleveland Clinic, ARUP
Laboratories, and Johns Hopkins Health and Medicine
Center,1 remain critical to the delivery of medical research
and patient care in the United States. These private research
institutions may individually treat more than 520,000
patients annually2 as well as using and developing
patentable biotech processes.3 By ignoring the needs of
1

. “The Johns Hopkins Health System Corporation (JHHS) is a not-forprofit organization dedicated to providing the highest quality patient health
care in the treatment and prevention of human illness.” About Johns
Hopkins Medicine, (last visited Feb. 9, 2008).
2
. See, e.g., MAYO CLINIC, ANSWERS: MAYO CLINIC 2006 ANNUAL REPORT , 20
(2007), available at http://www.mayoclinic.org/annualreport/.
3
. Id. at 51. Mayo Clinic invests significant resources in educational
and research programs:
Overall funding for Mayo research and education programs was
$634 million in 2006, an increase of $67 million over 2005.
Government, foundations and industry sources provided $319
million of the total amount—a 1.9 percent increase over 2005.
Mayo invested $315 million in research and education in 2006. This
includes Mayo funds and benefactor gifts.
Mayo will continue to partner with foundations, benefactors,
government and industry with mutual aims to support education
programs that train the next generation of medical professionals
and research programs that identify tomorrow’s medical
breakthroughs.
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private research institutions that provide both patient care
and develop and utilize emerging medical processes and
procedures, current patent policy places patients throughout
the United States, including patients not actually treated at
the non-profit institutions, at risk, since all patients
ultimately will incur the increased costs and time delays
caused by the legalities of medically related patents.
To that end, this Note argues that non-profit research
institutions, although they are leading centers of medical
care and therapy development, are fundamentally different
from other biotechnology research institutions and are being
overlooked in the current attempts by the courts to interpret
patent law and the current attempts by Congress to enact
new laws. The background of this note discusses the history
of patent law; analyzes the debate over the impact on
research of current patent practices in biotechnology;
suggests reasons non-profit, private, research institutions
have been ignored, and reviews current case law and the
patent legislation approved by the U.S. House of
Representatives in the fall of 2007. The Note then analyzes
whether the proposed “tragedy of the anticommons”
actually exists, particularly from the perspective of patients
at non-profit, research institutions, and suggests possible
reforms and areas for further research that would possibly
impact both congressional and judicial decision-making as
they interpret patent law or enact new patent legislation.
This note concludes that in the narrow sector of non-profit,
private, research hospitals, it seems that current theories
and research may not be exhaustive indicators of the entire
“tragedy of the anticommons” scenario. Since medical
research and testing is a societal mechanism for advancing
knowledge, health, and community development, and since
it is unclear whether the increased use of patents in
biotechnology is impeding or advancing scientific research,
the actual effect, as seen at non-profit, private, research
hospitals, may be harm to the patients. Therefore, the
current use of patents in biotechnology needs to be
reassessed, as current practices are likely to be against
public policy. A thorough understanding of the impact of
patents on non-profit institutions should enable Congress
and the courts to promote effective drug and diagnostic test
Id.

CAROLINE A. CRENSHAW, "PATENTS AND PATIENTS: WHO IS THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS IMPACTING AND WHO IS
BEARING THE COST OF HIGH-PRICED BIOTECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH?" 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 913-948
(2008).

916

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
[Vol. 9:2
development and patient care without raising prices or
discouraging development in other areas of biotech
research.

II. DEVELOPMENT OF PATENT USE IN BIOTECHNOLOGY
Patent law, historically, is designed to protect society
from a type of “market failure.”4 To encourage the creation
and disclosure of inventions, patents protect inventors in a
market economy from free-riders by “provid[ing] a right to
exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or
importing the patented invention . . . . Patents also provide
an
incentive
for
capitalists
to
invest
in
the
commercialization, including the further innovation, of
patented technology.”5 Ideally, patent law creates incentives
to invent, incentives to disclose and an incentive to
innovate.6 In fact, because this capitalist idea was
fundamental to the nation’s founding, the Constitution
expressly grants Congress the right to protect these
incentives:
“The Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries.”7 “By granting inventors
a limited monopoly over the use of their discoveries,
[generally 20 years from the date of filing,8] patent holders
will be able to receive a return on investment from their
creations.”9 Title 35 of the U.S. Code provides further
guidance for current patent law.10 To be patented an
invention must be novel, useful, and of a nonobvious
nature,11 and “[i]f a defendant is found guilty of patent
infringement in a civil lawsuit . . . the remedies available to
4

. Michael S. Mireles, An Examination of Patents, Licensing, Research
Tools and the Tragedy of the Anticommons in Biotechnology Innovation, 38
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 141, 144 (2004).
5
. Id.
6
. Id. at 150.
7
. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
8
. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2000).
9
. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INFLUENZA ANTIVIRAL DRUGS AND PATENT LAW
ISSUES 6 (2005) (internal citations omitted) [hereinafter YEH, INFLUENZA].
10
. See 35 U.S.C §§ 101–376 (2000).
11
. See 35 U.S.C §§ 101–103 (2000).
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the plaintiff include an injunction to cease and prohibit the
offending activity by the defendant, damages to compensate
for the infringement, and even attorney fees.”12

A. CONGRESS HELPS PATENTS FLOURISH

IN

BIOTECHNOLOGY

Beginning in the early 1980s, in an effort to promote
medical
research
and
product
development
in
biotechnology, both the courts and the federal government
encouraged privatization of medical research and patent
protection of new discoveries and treatment methods. In
1980 the Supreme Court decided in Diamond v. Chakrabarty
that
biotechnological
processes
and
products
are
patentable.13 Also in 1980 Congress passed the Bayh-Dole
Act, which allowed universities and small companies to
patent and retain the property rights in inventions developed
using federal funds.14 The passage of this Act increased joint
ventures between the public and the private sectors.15
Consequently, the number of patent filings in biotechnology
12

. YEH, INFLUENZA, supra note 9, at 7 (internal citations omitted).
. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307–09 (1980) (holding that
a live, human-made microorganism is patentable subject matter under 35
U.S.C. § 101, which provides for issuance of a patent to a person who
invents or discovers “any” new or useful “manufacture” or “composition of
matter”).
14
. See Patent and Trademark Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-517, (1980); Ass’n of Univ. Tech. Managers, Bayh-Dole Act,
http://www.autm. net/aboutTT/aboutTT_bayhDoleAct.cfm (last visited Nov.
4, 2007).
[T]he Bayh-Dole Act . . . created a uniform patent policy among the
many federal agencies that fund research, enabling small
businesses and non-profit organizations, including universities, to
retain title to inventions made under federally-funded research
programs. This legislation was co-sponsored by Senators Birch
Bayh of Indiana and Robert Dole of Kansas.
Id. See also Mireles, supra note 4, at 155.
15
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 155–56. Discussing the importance of the
Bayh-Dole Act, Mireles finds that
because the federal government is the largest source of funding for
research and development in the United States for universities . . . .
The government spends almost sixty percent of all funding for
research and development in universities in the United States.
Private industry funds about seventy-six percent of [total] research
and development in the United States. Prior to the passage of the
Bayh-Dole Act, less than four percent of all government funded
research was commercialized.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
13
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industries resulting from these joint ventures flourished.16
“The number of patent applications filed by qualifying
biotechnology organizations increased by more than 300
percent in the first five years after the enactment of the
legislation, as compared with the five years prior to the
passage of the Act.”17 According to doctors at the Mayo
Clinic, the ability of industry to use research generated by
taxpayer’s dollars made the “collaborations” explode, but
the physicians also note that at the same time some key
technical breakthroughs in molecular biology paved the way
for a flood of genetic discoveries. The patent laws
encouraged the large, profit-seeking companies to take
advantage of these new discoveries.18 The sudden influx of
patents in biotechnology drew attention—both positive and
negative—and continues to be debated.19 For example,
despite the increased number of patents and the
government’s “power to influence the affordability of the
resulting technologies, it has never used this authority.”20
This is problematic because:
under the current system, new technologies, no matter how
marginally effective, come to market at the highest prices. These
advancing medical technologies are a major cause of rapidly rising
16

. Id. at 156.
. Id. at 160–61.
18
. E-mail from Dr. Rebecca F. McClure, Assoc. Dir., Mayo Clinic Dep’ts
of Anatomic Pathology and Lab. Med. and Pathology, to Caroline Crenshaw,
J.D. Candidate, Univ. of Minn. (Feb. 7, 2008, 04:54:00 CST ) (on file with
author).
19
. Yann Joly, Open Source Approaches in Biotechnology: Utopia
Revisited, 59 ME. L. REV. 385, 386 (2007).
The exercise of intellectual property rights in such diverse fields of
creation as . . . biotechnology has met with intense opposition from
a growing number of detractors. In the field of biotechnology, the
critique has become important enough to arouse the attention of a
number of legislative bodies and propel the creation of an
important corpus of normative documents.
Id. (internal citations omitted). But see Innovation’s Golden Goose,
ECONOMIST, Dec. 14, 2002, (Technology Quarterly), at 3 (“Together with
amendments in 1984 and augmentation in 1986, this unlocked all the
inventions and discoveries that had been made in laboratories throughout
the United States with the help of taxpayers’ money. More than anything,
this single policy measure helped to reverse America’s precipitous slide
into industrial irrelevance.”).
20
. Merrill Goozner, Innovation in Biomedicine: Can Stem Cell Research
Lead the Way to Affordability?, 3 PLOS MED. 0611, 0611 (2006), available at
http://medicine.plosjournals.org/archive/1549-1676/3/5/pdf/10.1371_journal
. pmed.0030126-S.pdf.
17
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health-care spending throughout the industrial world. Second,
biomedical innovation in the U.S., long considered the global
leader, has slowed markedly in the past half decade. Despite
escalating research spending in the public and private sectors, the
number of new drugs and biologics recently approved by the U.S.
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has fallen below previous eras.
. . . And those new therapies that have been approved tend to have
less significance than medical advances of the past.21

To address the issue the House of Representatives
passed “the most comprehensive patent reform in half a
century” on September 7, 2007.22 The legislation will
supposedly (1) make patents harder to obtain; (2) easier to
challenge, and (3) curtail litigation by limiting where patent
owners can file suit (venue) and how much they can collect
in damages.23 According to one of the legislation’s cosponsors, Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX), “Too many patents of
questionable integrity have been approved, and owners of
these patents have found a unique way to make money.”24
While Congress passed this legislation to address the
efficacy of the current patent system, the impact of the new
legislation might not have the desired result. While
supporters of the legislation, primarily biotech and
pharmaceutical firms, agree with Congressman Smith and
argue that “[a] proliferation of low-quality patents,
skyrocketing litigation costs and potentially ruinous damages
for patent infringement have . . . combined to undermine the
foundations of inventive-ness,”25 others caution against
sweeping legislation.26 For example, dissenters note that
past reforms led to such major changes as the 1982 creation
of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a court
committed solely to intellectual property issues. This led to
“strengthened patent protection, lowered the bar for
21

. Id. at 611–12.
. Catherine Rampell, House Approves Comprehensive Patent
Overhaul, WASH. POST, Sept. 8, 2007, at D1.
23
. Bloomberg News, House Passes Bill to Curb Suits by Patent Owners,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, at C4 (The House legislation will limit the damages
awarded in patent litigation to the value of the specific small item or part
that was infringed rather than the value of the entire product, which simply
uses the smaller idea as one component in a larger good); see Patent
Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007).
24
. Bloomberg News, supra note 23, at C4.
25
. Claude Barfield & John E. Calfee, Congress’s Patent Mistakes, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 29, 2007, at A18.
26
. Id.
22
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inventiveness (‘non-obviousness’ in patent-law jargon), and
paved the way for large damages against alleged patent
infringers.”27 The centralized decisions of the new court
instinctively
supported
patent
holders.28
Therefore,
opponents of the House legislation argue that as Congress
considers reforming patent law,29 “[i]ncremental reform is a
better idea than radical change.”30

B. “TRAGEDY

OF THE

ANTICOMMONS” THEORY

In 1998 Michel Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg31 published
an article suggesting that the increase of patents might have
distinct negative consequences on future research opportunities.32 Heller and Eisenberg agree with Garrett Hardin,33
who popularized the original theory of the “tragedy of the
commons,”34 which argues that society will overuse common
resources because there is no incentive to conserve the
resources.35 Yet, Heller and Eisenberg argue that too much
privatization may be detrimental, rather than beneficial, in
27

. Id.
. See id.
29
. See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007); S. 1145, 110th Cong.,
(2d Sess. 2008).
30
. Barfield & Calfee, supra note 25.
31
. “One motivation for patent reform is a concern that the overproliferation of patents, instead of encouraging innovation, is stifling it. This
argument achieved prominence in an influential 1998 article published in
Science by two University of Michigan law professors, Michael A. Heller and
Rebecca S. Eisenberg.” Ronald Bailey, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Do Patents Actually Impede Innovation?, REASONONLINE, Oct. 2, 2007, http://
www.reason.com/news/show/122785.html.
32
. Michael Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter
Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698
(1998).
33
. “Trained as an ecologist and microbiologist and a Professor of
Human Ecology at the University of California for more than thirty years, he
is best known for his 1968 essay, ‘The Tragedy of the Commons.’” The
Garrett Hardin Society, http://www.garretthardinsociety.org/ (last visited
Nov. 4, 2007). The phrase, “tragedy of the commons,” derives originally
from a comparison of medieval village land holding noticed by William
Forster Lloyd in his 1833 book on population. WILLIAM FORSTER LLOYD, TWO
LECTURES ON THE CHECKS TO POPULATION (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press,
1833). The theory itself dates to Thucydides and Aristotle. William Forster
Lloyd, 1795–1852, http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/profiles/lloyd.htm (last
visited Feb. 10, 2008).
34
. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 698.
35
. Id.
28
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the realm of biomedical research.36 Heller and Eisenberg
posit:
The tragedy of the anticommons refers to the more complex
obstacles that arise when a user needs access to multiple patented
inputs to create a single useful product. Each upstream patent
allows its owner to set up another tollbooth on the road to product
development, adding to the cost and slowing the pace of
downstream biomedical innovations.37

In other words, having to spend the time and money to
buy many different patented elements necessary to create a
new drug or therapy inhibits biomedical advances and
research. Later literature addressed other problems that
might result from this proposed overuse of patents. For
example, if multiple research tools are necessary in product
development, it might be difficult to negotiate a license
agreement with each of the patent holders.38 Further, if the
license agreements include a reach-through provision, which
allows the patent holder to profit if the research tool
ultimately contributes to a successful final product, the
agreements might “erode profit potential, creating a
disincentive for companies that require a number of research
tools to develop specific commercial products or services.”39
As a result of the 1998 Heller and Eisenberg study and
its progeny, suggesting that privatization needs to be “more
carefully deployed if it is to serve the public goals of
biomedical research,”40 varying policies and theories have
attempted to find a balance by encouraging the
development of beneficial products and treatments without
strangling experimental research.
C. THE DOMINANT POLICY ARGUMENTS
Patent protection has encouraged certain developments
because patent holders, both public and private, reap
financial benefits for their work.41 This monetary incentive
36

. Id.
. Id. at 699.
38
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 165.
39
. See id. at 165 (describing different possible problems with
increased patent use, such as blocking patents, complementary patents,
and increased transaction costs).
40
. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 701.
41
. “[P]atents facilitate innovation by rationalizing the allocation of
resources necessary to develop a particular invention . . . .Whereas a single
patent holder can orchestrate exploitation of a technological prospect,
37
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likely changed the overall dynamic and widely held belief in
“open research” previously adhered to among research
institutions, pharmaceutical companies, small start-up
groups, and hospitals.42 For example, with guaranteed patent
protection providing security for financial windfalls of new
discoveries, venture
capitalist
firms have become
increasingly willing to support small biotech start-up firms.43
These small, start-up businesses are arguably fundamental
for diversity in research, which might be lost without patent
protection.44 Mayo physicians, on the other hand, note that
historically this might have been true, when the individuals
“starting up” the companies were actually the people
making the discoveries. Now, though, most start-ups are just
businesses that make no contribution to the research itself
and provide no diversity of research. Today’s start-up firms
tend to depend on academic centers for expertise and
guidance in validation of their products. If they do not, their
products are usually inadequate and die out.45
Meanwhile, as patent laws evolved, universities and
private industry began collaborating, most likely because
pharmaceutical companies envisioned increased financial
rewards in both marketing and production of the new
technologies.
The [pharmaceutical] companies do not have the access to
patients and assays required to validate their products. They have
to collaborate with medical centers to get the data and medical
expertise they need to get their products past the regulatory
agencies and to the market. They have managed to get the
expertise for free, because the people they get it from generally
lack business savvy and the legal support that protects them from
giving their time and information away for essentially nothing.
Dangle the chance of publication in front of researchers in an
academic institution, and they will have their lab employees work
night and day to generate data for nothing.46
allowing all parties free access to that prospect may produce ‘chaotic,
duplication, and wasteful’ effort.” Peter Lee, Patents, Paradigm Shifts, and
Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 670 (2004).
42
. “These scholars observe a fundamental tension between the
proprietary development of end-product pharmaceuticals and the research
community’s tradition of open, communal science. Privatization and
commercialization ‘threaten to undermine certain cornerstones of our
scientific infrastructure.’” Id. at 672.
43
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 162–63.
44
. Id. at 157.
45
. McClure, supra note 18.
46
. Id.
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While universities might have freely disseminated the
information in order to advance educational research,
privatization insulated them from costly competition, again,
arguably encouraging research and innovation.47 Yet,
patents discourage “the wide sharing of information [which]
helps to place information in the possession of the people
who can best use it, even if these people are not the original
discoverer or inventor.”48 As a result, these collaborative
efforts might be preventing the most efficient use of
resources. Again, the ultimate effect of increased patent
protection in biotech-nological research is unclear, but, as
discussed below, the courts seem willing to uphold
traditional patent law in this innovative arena.

D. THE CURRENT ROLE

OF THE

COURTS

IN

BIOTECHNOLOGY

AND

PATENTS

Although Congress may listen to policy arguments and
amend legislation in efforts to remedy “perceived
deficiencies,”49 the courts of the United States also play a
major role in patent interpretation, litigation and law.
While the Supreme Court has left the Federal Circuit’s opinions
undisturbed in the vast majority of patent cases since the creation
of the specialized patent court in 1982, the Court has shown, over
the past three terms, an increased willingness to hear cases that
raise patent law issues. The Supreme Court Justices’ apparent
newfound interest in patent cases perhaps stems from a
recognition of the growing importance of intellectual property to
the nation’s informed-based economy, as well as the need to
correct perceived errors in the lower courts’ interpretation and
application of patent law.50
47

. Mireles, supra note 4, at 161–62.
An outside technology transfer firm, a university foundation, or an
‘in house’ technology transfer office typically do the administration
and transfer of a university’s property rights . . . . University patent
policies often require that the university researcher assign her
rights in an invention to the university . . . . [T]he university will
reserve the right to acquire title in any invention the inventor
wishes to commercialize.

Id.
48

. Id. at 187; see Lee, supra note 41, at 671 (“[S]tudies debunked the
popular conception of the solitary scientist toiling alone in his laboratory.
[Studies] showed instead that scientists work in communities, where
[freely] sharing information, theories, and even materials fundamentally
facilitates basic research.”).
49
. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT U.S. SUPREME
COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN PATENT LAW 1 (2007).
50
. Id.
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In fact, the Supreme Court, in the past five years, has
granted certiorari in eight patent cases.51 A few of these
recent patent decisions, combined with earlier rulings, have
significantly shaped and will continue to shape patent law
application in biomedical research, as discussed below.

1. The Utility Requirement
In order to be awarded a patent, the inventor most show,
among other requirements, that the patent fulfills the utility
requirement.52 “The utility requirement ensures that the
public receives an invention that is useful in exchange for
the limited right to exclude others from practicing the
invention. An invention is useful if it performs some function
of positive benefit to society.”53
Initially, the Supreme Court decided in Brenner v.
Manson,54 a case involving a new chemical process, that “a
patent is not a hunting license. It is not a reward for the
search, but compensation for its successful conclusion.”55
51

. Id.
. “Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.” 35 U.S.C § 101 (2000).
53
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 195.
54
. 383 U.S. 519 (1965).
In December 1957, Howard Ringold and George Rosenkranz
applied for a patent on an allegedly novel process for making
certain known steroids . . . . Whatever weight is attached to the
value of encouraging disclosure and of inhibiting secrecy, we
believe a more compelling consideration is that a process patent in
the chemical field, which has not been developed and pointed to
the degree of specific utility, creates a monopoly of knowledge
which should be granted only if clearly commanded by the statute.
Until the process claim has been reduced to production of a
product shown to be useful, the metes and bounds of that
monopoly are not capable of precise delineation. It may engross a
vast, unknown, and perhaps unknowable area. Such a patent may
confer power to block off whole areas of scientific development,
without compensating benefit to the public. The basic quid pro quo
contemplated by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a
patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from an
invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is
refined and developed to this point—where specific benefit exists in
currently available form—there is insufficient justification for
permitting an applicant to engross what may prove to be a broad
field.
Id. at 520–35.
55
. Id. at 536.
52
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However, the Federal Circuit Court in In re Brana stated in a
biotechnology patent case, “[u]sefulness in patent law, and
in particular in the context of pharmaceutical inventions,
necessarily includes the expectation of further research and
development. The stage at which an invention in this field
becomes useful is well before it is ready to be administered
to humans.”56 The courts seem to favor finding utility in
most biotechnology research tools,57 making the patent easy
to get.
There are other limits on patentability. For example, the
Patent Act states that one who “invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or any
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title.”58 The Supreme
Court originally interpreted the Act as limited to processes,
machines, manufactures, and compositions of matter and
not “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas,” which may not be patented.59 A doctor from Mayo
points out that, “If this were really followed, much of our
current biotechnology mess would vanish.”60
In a dispute between Laboratory Corporation and
Metabolite
Laboratories,
Metabolite
filed
a
patent
infringement lawsuit against Laboratory, which had
encouraged doctors to administer a test based on a
Laboratory patent for a research method that correlated
elevated levels of amino acid with vitamin deficiencies..61
The Federal Circuit held that Laboratory’s actions were a
“direct infringement of the patent.”62 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to decide the question whether:
[A] method patent setting forth an indefinite, undescribed, and
non-enabling step directing a party simply to “correlat[e]” test
results can validly claim a monopoly over a basic scientific
relationship used in medical treatment such that any doctor
necessarily infringes the patent merely by thinking about the
relationship after looking at a test result.63
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

In Re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1568 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
Mireles, supra note 4, at 201.
35 U.S.C § 101.
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
McClure, supra note 18.
Id.
Id. at 1364–65.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Metabolite Labs v. Lab. Corp. of Am.
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The Court ultimately dismissed the case on a technicality
and stated that the writ of certiorari was “improvidently
granted.”64 This decision affirmed the infringement liability.
Justice Stephen Breyer dissented. “Those who engage in
medical research, who practice medicine, and who as
patients depend upon proper health care, might well benefit
from this Court’s authoritative answer.”65 He also went on to
state that the patent should not have been validated
because “[t]here can be little doubt that the correlation
between homocysteine and vitamin deficiency . . . is a
‘natural phenomenon’” that is not patentable.66 Thus, the
Court allowed for possibly low-quality patents, which
Congress is now railing against. Because it can decide what
constitutes “natural phenomenon,” the Court makes it easier
to obtain biomedical patents. The problems with this lenient
definition are amplified in the non-profit sector of medicine:
Although I am not entirely clear whether the whole genome has
been patented at this point, I can tell you that every mutation
found in every disease today is. This leads to all of the problems
one could imagine we would have had if Newton had been able to
patent gravity. This means that whoever holds the patent
essentially controls the entire United States with respect to
anything done with that gene/mutation. In my world, where a
clinical test for the mutation may be useful or necessary for clinical
care, this can range from licensing/royalty fees of unlimited
amount to excluding anyone or everyone of the patent holder’s
choosing from testing, to forcing the testing to be done at their
designated location or with their designated kit, at their designated
price for their sole profit. Not only does this have obvious
implications for the increased cost of medical care single center
testing is really dangerous for medical care. All genetic tests are in
a constant state of flux and require unlimited “peer review” to
make sure they are running appropriately, being interpreted
appropriately, and open to modifi-cation using better methods over
time. In almost all instances, the more removed clinical testing is
from the physicians using it, the less likely it is to be optimally
monitored and interpreted. Many of the tests used must be
interpreted in the clinical context and in conjunction with other
tests. This can not be done effectively by companies with no
medical affiliations. The mistakes/inconveniences/ waste that
accumulate when pure businesses try to monopolize medical
testing are costly to all. If we could enforce the Supreme Court’s
Holdings, 126 S. Ct. 543 (No. 04-607), 2004 WL 2505526.
64
. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, 126 S. Ct. 2921,
2921 (2006) (per curiam).
65
. Id. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66
. Id. at 2927 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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definition of patentability [limited to processes, machines,
manufactures, and compositions of matter] we would have a good
start on the problem.67

2. The Fair Use Exception
Some scholars argue that “specific market failures that
current patent doctrine does not remedy” could be remedied
by a fair use exception.68 These scholars argue that fair use
“could be used to excuse infringement by researchers
attempting to invent around the patent even when the
eventual end product is to be marketed commercially.” 69
While the courts could grant this exception, some academics
argue that “[t]he expense and time involved in obtaining a
patent for a non-pioneering, yet patentable invention may
not be justified if a broad fair use defense is available.” 70
Thus, these academics contend that courts should reject an
expanded version of the fair use doctrine. This argument
should be challenged with regard to the impact of patents on
private research institutions, particularly since the Supreme
Court in 2005 partially recognized one fair use exception,
noting that “The Patent Act’s safe harbor provision has often
been compared to the ‘fair use’ defense in copyright law,
since it immunizes from liability otherwise infringing acts . . .
to advance compelling public policy interests.”71
The Patent Act’s safe harbor provision was addressed in
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd v. Merck KGaA. The Federal Circuit
court held that the safe harbor provision (the Hatch-Waxman
Act)72 for the use of patented inventions reasonably related
67

. McClure, supra note 18.
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 202.
69
. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law,
100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1238 (2000).
70
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 204.
71
. BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., SAFE HARBOR FOR PRECLINICAL USE OF
PATENTED INVENTIONS IN DRUG RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT: MERCK KGAA V. INTEGRA
LIFESCIENCES I, LTD. 3 (2005) [hereinafter YEH, SAFE HARBOR].
72
. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
The statutory exception was created by the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the
Hatch-Waxman Act. This legislation modified the Patent Act by
creating a new section 35 U.S.C. § 271(e), that provides “safe
harbor” from infringement for pharmaceutical companies using
patented invention in their drug research and development
operations. The Hatch-Waxman act is widely credited with
encouraging and expediting the creation and availability of generic
versions of approved patented drugs.
68
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to the development and submission of information, applies
only to the use of patented material in the FDA approval
process of generic drugs, which should be allowed onto the
market as soon as the patent on the name brand drug runs
out.73 To expedite the FDA approval process it is necessary,
according to the court, to allow this narrow research
exception.74 The Supreme Court, however, unanimously held
that
[I]t [is] apparent from the statutory text that §271(e)(1)’s
exemption from infringement extends to all uses of patented
inventions that are reasonably related to the development and
submission of any information under the FDCA. . . . This necessarily
includes preclinical studies of patented compounds that are
appropriate for submission to the FDA in the regulatory process.
There is simply no room in the statute for excluding certain
information from the exemption on the basis of the phase of
research in which it is developed or the particular submission in
which it could be included.75

The Court then limited its decision and followed the
Federal Circuit’s holding that the exemption does not include
all experimental activity. Basic research is unprotected
unless the patented compound produces a “particular”
physiological effect through a “particular” biological
process.76
Ultimately, the Supreme Court failed to answer one
major question relevant to non-profit institutions. The Court
refused to decide whether, or to what extent, the exemption
applies to patented research tools,77 since the matter was
not at issue in the case.78

YEH, SAFE HARBOR, supra note 71, at 2.
73
. Integra Lifesciences, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 867–68
(Fed. Cir. 2003); Mireles, supra note 4, at 214–16.
74
. Integra Lifesciences, 331 F.3d at 866–67.
75
. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 202 (2005)
(citations omitted).,
76
. YEH, SAFE HARBOR, supra note 71, at 8.
77
. Research tools are defined as “tools that scientists use in the
laboratory, including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal
models, growth factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones
and cloning tools (such as PCR), methods, laboratory equipment and
machines.” Sharing Biomedical Research Resources: Principles and
Guidelines for Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts, 64 Fed.
Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n. 1 (Dec. 23, 1999).
78
. YEH, SAFE HARBOR, supra note 71, at 2.

CAROLINE A. CRENSHAW, "PATENTS AND PATIENTS: WHO IS THE TRAGEDY OF THE ANTICOMMONS IMPACTING AND WHO IS
BEARING THE COST OF HIGH-PRICED BIOTECHNOLOGICAL RESEARCH?" 9(2) MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 913-948
(2008).

2008]

PATENTS & PATIENTS
3. The Experimental Use Exception

929

Historically, the courts developed a common law
experimental use exception to patent law infringement.79
The courts were initially unwilling to punish patent infringers
for uses that were “for the sole purpose of gratifying a
philosophical taste, or curiosity, or for mere amusement”80
Congress reiterated this general philosophy by enacting the
statutory experimental use exception, which exempted
patented materials which were being used in clinical
research trials. This statute could open the door for an
expanded application of the experimental use exception.
However, two recent Federal Circuit cases sharply narrow
the exception.
First, the Federal Circuit court in Madey v. Duke
University held that the exception could not be used in
university research if there were any possible commercial
uses, including simply furthering the universities’ legitimate
business interests.81 Thus, universities could be sued for
patent infringement, despite a philanthropic motive behind
the patent infringement. “The Federal Circuit’s decision can
contribute to the anticommons phenomena, as university
researchers must either find and license patents to basic
research tools or risk liability for patent infringement.”82
Further, while Duke, a private institution, may face
liability, many public institutions will not. “A legal doctrine
known as sovereign immunity protects states and state
institutions from legal liability. Courts have held that
participating in the federal patent system doesn’t cost a
state its immunity. The upshot—states can sue, but
effectively can’t be sued.”83 Although Congress passed laws
limiting the states’ ability to hide behind this shield, the
Supreme Court overruled Congress in 1999 and continued to
protect the states’ immunity from lawsuits “giving states and
state-sponsored
institutions
protection
from
patentinfringement lawsuits in federal court.”84 Private institutions,
79

. Mireles, supra note 4, at 205.
. Poppenhusen v. Falke, 19 F. Cas. 1048, 1049 (C.C.N.Y. 1861) (No.
11, 279).
81
. See Madey v. Duke, 413 F. Supp. 2d 601 (M.D.N.C. 2006).
82
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 209.
83
. Peter Lattman, Critics Take Aim at California’s Patent Shield, WALL
ST. J., Nov. 13, 2007 at B1.
84
. Id.
80
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including non-profits, enjoy no such protection. As the legal
community and the federal government have attempted to
balance, through patents, the uses and development of
resources, the Heller and Eisenberg suggestion that in
biomedical technology, “a proliferation of intellectual
property rights upstream may be stifling life-saving
innovations further downstream in the course of research
and product development,”85 continues to be debated. Some
commentators appear to agree with the court rulings in
these cases, stating “extension of the experimental use
exception to include uses of research tools for some or any
commercial purpose would effectively destroy the market for
those tools, thus removing any incentives to create research
tools.”86 Despite the courts’ rulings, the intellectual debate
regarding the actual impact of patents on downstream
research continues.

E. STUDIES ASSESSING THE ACCURACY OF THE TRAGEDY OF
THEORY IN LIGHT OF CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ACTION

THE

ANTICOMMONS

A 2007 study found that the number of biotechnological
patents per year peaked in 1998, when 5,977 patents were
issued.87 After 1998 there was a subsequent decline and
leveling off.88 As of 2004, only 4,324 biotechnological
patents were issued.89 Although one interpretation of this
trend might suggest that research and technology is
suffering, since the number of patents issued is declining, it
could simply be that the patent office does not possess the
resources to keep up with the number of patent
applications.90 Or, possibly, the boom in discovery fueled by
technological breakthroughs just inherently slowed as the
low lying fruit was picked during the “boom.”91 The 2007
study noted that looking at the patent numbers alone does
not confirm the prophesized harm to biotech research.92 In
85

. Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 698.
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 214.
87
. David Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The
Mismeasure of Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TX. L. REV.
1677, 1687 (2007).
88
. Id.
89
. Id.
90
. Id.
91
. McClure, supra note 18.
92
. Adelman & DeAngeli, supra note 87, at 1687.
86
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addition, a 2002 study conducted by John P. Walsh, found no
indication that drug discoveries have been impeded by the
increased use of patents.93 In fact, “the vast majority of
respondents say that there are no cases in which valuable
research projects were stopped because of intellectual
property (IP) problems relating to research inputs.”94 The
study eventually concluded that research is not inhibited
because: (1) increased costs resulting from patent
proliferation are not prohibitive for large firms; (2)
universities are often allowed to continue research despite
possible patent infringement for “educational purposes;” and
(3) many up-start firms do not worry about patents because
infringement is hard to detect, expensive to prosecute, and
often small companies have few resources, making civil
litigation for monetary recovery pointless.95
On the other hand, a 1998 study conducted by the
National Institutes of Health (NIH) suggested that
researchers involved in biotechnology are concerned about
difficulties and delays resulting from the increased
privatization of “research tools.”96 The NIH study concluded
that “virtually every firm . . . believed that restricted access
to research tools is impeding the rapid advance of research
and that the problem is getting worse.”97 Also, even the
aforementioned Walsh study admitted that “small-start up
firms and universities find the licensing fees for research
tools prohibitively expensive . . . and that there are noneconomic costs such as publication restrictions for university
researchers.”98 Again, there is little consensus, but what all
of the studies ignore is the impact on patients.
Overall, the most frequently discussed solutions,
93

. See John P. Walsh et al., Innovation in a Knowledge-Based
Economy, in PATENTING AND LICENSING OF RESEARCH TOOLS AND BIOMEDICAL INNOVATION 285
(Levin & Meyers eds. National Academies Press) (2003).
94
. Id.
95
. Id.
96
. See Mireles, supra note 4, at 145 (explaining the study and defining
“[a] research tool [as] a technology that is used by pharmaceutical and
biotechnology companies to find, refine or otherwise design and identify a
potential product or properties of a potential drug product,” such as
“fragment of a gene, a gene, ‘cell lines, monoclonal antibodies.’”); NATIONAL
INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH WORKING GROUP ON
RESEARCH
TOOLS
3
(1998),
available
at
http://www.nih.gov/news/
researchtools/index.htm.
97
. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 96, at 3.
98
. See Walsh, supra note 93, at 285.
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alternative views, or suggestions to either counter or solve
the problem include: broadening the scope of the
experimental use exception to patent infringement; creating
a fair use exception to the patent infringement; using patent
pools; Congressional adoption of “a law similar to the
proposed Genomic Science and Technology Innovation Act of
2002, which requires the government to conduct a study
regarding the effect of government policy on biotechnology
innovation;”99 creation of “a publicly available database of
proprietary research tools and licenses;”100 focusing on the
benefits of an open source approach;101 and focusing on
ulterior effects of patents on paradigm shifts, which furthers
research and development.102 In light of the downstream
impact on patients, some of these solutions, including a
narrow definition of what is patentable, should be
considered.

III. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS AFFECTING PUBLIC POLICY
DECISIONS
A. COMPARISON

OF

PROPOSED THEORIES

The NIH studies suggest that doctors and researchers
are, in fact, worried about delays and costly uses of research
tools as a result of the reality of the “tragedy of the
anticommons.”103 NIH argues that some research tools, such
as the raw human genomic DNA sequence information,
should not be patentable, reflecting the continued sentiment
that some scientific knowledge should be openly shared and
utilized.104 On the other hand, many patent attorneys, the
writers of the Constitution, and a group of highly regarded
legal professors and scholars believe that patent law is
fundamental to inventions and disclosure of information.105
99

. Mireles, supra note 4, at 146.
. Id. at 147.
101
. Joly, supra note 19, at 386.
102
. Arguably patents increase research because patent law forces
scientists to think about problems in a new light rather than using
established research, which might, ultimately, be wrong. Patents
encourage innovation in the research industry, thereby enhancing overall
research. Lee, supra note 41, at 661.
103
. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 96.
104
. Lee, supra note 41, at 677.
105
. Id. at 669; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
100
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Professor Peter Lee106 suggests that “[a]rguments both for
and against patents demonstrate the degree to which legal
commentators have been preoccupied with relating patents
to normal progress rather than to the evolution of scientific
theory.”107 He suggests that “the argument that patents
actually deter scientific exchange within prevailing
paradigms is important in establishing the larger thesis that
patents encourage the generation of alternate scientific
theories that drive paradigm shifts.”108 Lee suggests that
patents force inventors and researchers to look at scientific
theories from a new perspective in an effort to invent around
patented material, which furthers scientific invention by
forcing researches to avoid using the already established
ideas. This, in turn, promotes and generates downstream
research.109 Eventually these “paradigm shifts” will indeed
occur through the natural course of research and
development. Conversely, though, it seems likely that widely
available information about successful research and
unsuccessful research could lead scientists and doctors
down that same “paradigm shifting” path, and possibly
sooner than if scientists are forced to work in a vacuum
regarding previous successes and failures. Regardless, Lee’s
work emphasizes the “unique status of research tools as
gateways to basic scientific research and downstream
development suggest[ing] that patent law should treat them
differently than traditional end products.”110 Arguably, the
courts and Congress might consider addressing the patent
problem from a new perspective to establish positive policies
that are an agreeable compromise between patent
supporters and detractors.111
Unfortunately, a compromise is difficult because both
sides of the debate are “correct” from certain perspectives.
For example, as discussed above, small start-up firms need
funding to perform the expensive work that biotechnology
research requires. These start-ups focus on niche problems,
add new ideas, and broaden overall scientific research and
106

. Acting Prof. of Law, Univ. of Cal. at Davis, School of Law,
http://www.law.ucdavis.edu/faculty/lee.shtml (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
107
. Lee, supra note 41, at 669.
108
. See id.
109
. Id.
110
. Id. at 679.
111
. See Barfield & Calfee, supra note 25.
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diversity.112 Since the Constitution protects innovation by
guaranteeing the right to “their respective discoveries” for a
certain amount of time,”113 the Constitution arguably
protects all types of discoveries in biotechnology, including
basic research tools.114 This fundamental protection allows
small inventors access to the market and encourages and
increases diversity in research,115 thereby providing
incentives for monetary gain and allowing start-up groups to
develop funding—just as they are structured to do.116
Pharmaceutical companies, which also are fundamental
to drug production and development, are similarly protected
by patent law. For example, important research companies,
like Pfizer,117 are able to fund unique projects as a result of
sizeable revenues.118 Pfizer, though, while a cornerstone of
research and development, is ultimately a corporation and,
therefore, profit driven.119 Consequently, patent protection
and licensing agreements are necessary; they enable Pfizer
to insure that successful products will be monetarily
rewarded. In reality, though, these companies pay little for
their research while reaping significant financial rewards. For
example:
A large pharmaceutical company wants to “partner” with us [Mayo]
112

. See Mireles, supra note 4, at 163.
. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 154 (patents are generally
protected for 20 years).
114
. See generally Integra Lifesciences, Ltd. v. Merck KFaA, 545 U.S. 193
(2005).
115
. See Mireles, supra note 4, at 163.
116
. But see McClure, supra note 18, who states,
I don’t really buy the data that says the incentive of business
collaboration drives scientific discovery, at least to the extent it is
used as an argument for the current system. In my experience,
most scientists will discover whether there is a business
opportunity or not, if they are funded to do their work. I think it is a
very small group that goes into basic research thinking they are
going to make a big discovery and get rich. Most of the great
discoveries are made by people passionate about investigation
with no interest in the business end of their discoveries at all—just
publication recognition.
117
. Pfizer represents “the world’s largest pharmaceutical research
effort, which includes more than 13,000 scientists worldwide, supported by
$7.6 billion in funding during 2006.” Pfizer: Science Policy,
http://www.pfizer.com/
research/science_policy/science_policy.jsp
(last
visited Oct. 27, 2007).
118
. Pfizer conducts research in 19 different disease areas, “more than
any other company,” and made $48.4 billion in revenue in 2006. Id.
119
. Id.
113
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to develop a therapy and a clinical test to go along with it. Although
they [the pharmaceutical company] would not disclose much at the
early stages of negotiations, it sounds like they bought IP from a
university regarding some genetic markers in a type of lymphoma.
They are sure “it is a winner.” They do not have the expertise to
develop and validate a clinical test that will detect these markers
and be able to be used for monitoring when therapy (their new
drug) is used. They would like us to develop and validate the assay
for them and get it approved by FDA (provided it gets that far). Our
business people will negotiate some cut of the profits if it is
successful. However, the cost of all of this up to now has been
entirely funded by the taxpayer, either here or in a foreign country,
depending on where they bought their IP. Any expenses the
company incurs from here on out will get passed on in the cost of
the product. The patent holders can make as much money as they
want, as they can completely dictate how much everyone pays to
use the test. But they won’t have much cost, because Mayo is
doing the work. Aside from any “cut” in the profits that Mayo might
negotiate, the main incentive for Mayo to negotiate is to protect
itself from the costs of running the test for its own patients, should
the therapy be a big success. We will negotiate some “more
reasonable” fee for ourselves to use the test when it is on the
market (it is never free despite our involvement). So, while Mayo
will get a break on the cost of running the test due to our
“collaboration”, the other big testing centers like us will not. Mayo,
being non-profit, will pump any money from this back into our R&D
costs and then we are back to the whole point of why we need so
much more than others to cover our R&D costs. If the venture is
not successful, they lose the money they spent on the IP and Mayo
loses whatever money it spends associated with the effort. Despite
our best negotiations, we still always feel like the loser, because if
we don’t negotiate to their liking, they will go to someone else who
will. We then get a reputation for “not working well with industry”
and, despite the reality, patients and management (even here)
perceive that “working with industry” is a good thing and rank
medical institutions, in part, by these types of collaborations.120

Finally, under the Bayh-Dole Act, universities are allowed
to patent discoveries researched with federal funding.121
Although university research is historically aimed at
furthering knowledge and education and is spurred on by
intellectual curiosity—the reason government funding is
given to universities—the ability to protect that information
through patents has led to joint ventures with private
corporations.122 Today private corporations make money by
leveraging govern-ment funds that support research
120
121
122

. McClure, supra note 18.
. Goozner, supra note 20, at 0611.
. Id.
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conducted at large universities. Universities, in return,
increase their prestige and attract government funding by
protecting and taking credit for patentable research.123
Freely disseminated information via research papers and
pure intellectual curiosity may be lost,124 but joint
development efforts can be immensely successful, perhaps
leading to increased, rather than decreased, downstream
research.
In sum, adherents of current patent laws argue that
society not only benefits, but downstream research and
inventions in biotechnology may continue to develop as a
result of the patent laws. According to this argument,
patents do not always pose a problem because
“pharmaceutical companies frequently exercise ‘rational
forbearance’ in deciding not to sue investigators at research
institutions for patent infringement.”125 The companies might
not sue, and therefore, the argument continues, the chilling
effect of patent violation decreases. Nonetheless, many of
the likely reasons pharmaceutical companies ignore patent
infringement—there is no money to be won from small-start
ups; large state universities have sovereign immunity—fail to
protect non-profit research institutions. While some patent
violators may not suffer, the large, well-funded, non-profit
institutions, who use a significant number of patented
materials every day, can afford to pay and do get sued.
As the recent studies conducted by NIH show,126
researchers and doctors believe that downstream research is
being restricted. Despite the literature that emphasizes the
importance of patents, it seems fairly clear that forcing
scientists and doctors to involve lawyers and pay for or
establish a licensing agreement deters research. When
companies hold patents on procedures and processes that
are used in multiple tests and in a variety of forms, the ease
of research, exploration, use, and modification of research
123

. “The 1980 Bayh-Dole Act gives research institutions the primary
responsibility for maximizing the health-and-economic-development
benefits from government research funding.” Id.
124
. “Open development exposes new input to all interested eyes and
thus encourages an open, critical discussion in order to foster higher
quality research. In the course of such peer review, the contributor’s
reputation improves by creating useful solutions and contributing sound
critical evaluations of the work of others.” Joly, supra note 19, at 398.
125
. See Lee, supra note 41, at 677.
126
. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, supra note 96.
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tools is limited.127 It also seems that patent expenses are a
barrier to entry for small researchers who cannot find
venture capitalist funding.128 It is clear that increased
protection of patents does, at the very least, drive up costs
for researchers at all institutions and at all stages of
research. In addtion, pharmaceutical companies obtain
patents at minimal cost.
The majority of patentable medical discoveries are made using
government/tax dollar funding because this type of work is
inherently costly and inefficient, with much money spent on dead
ends with only an occasional useful discovery. The bulk of this work
is done in university centers in the United States. More and more
discoveries today, though, are made outside the United States and
paid for by citizens of other countries. When the protections
provided by a patent are granted to the discoverers to allow them
to make money on their discovery, they don’t actually pay for the
costs associated with discovery—the people/patients have already
paid them through taxes. Since the businesses are only going to
buy patents for “inventions” they think will make them money,
they are essentially avoiding almost all discovery costs, which the
taxpayer is footing. The businesses avoid the real costs of medical
discovery by trolling for good ideas in medical literature and
meetings of academic institutions. They then purchase only
promising technology and sell it at inflated prices back to the
public, who both paid for it and put in the discovery effort. In
addition, all of the legal fees involved in enforcing their patents get
billed back to the people/health care system.129

As a result, the non-profit institutions have to make more
money to break even, which, inevitably, involves treating
more patients, charging them more, and/or cutting costs in
other areas of the hospital.
In sum, though patents do encourage potential monetary
rewards and continued research and development, they also
limit research and development by increasing costs for and
127

. For example,
As evidence for a biomedical anticommons, analysts regularly cite
the high profile case of ‘probably the most hated diagnostics
company,’ Myriad Genetics. In the 1990s, Myriad Genetics
patented and developed a test for variations in the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes that greatly increase a woman’s risk of breast and
ovarian cancer. The company refused to license its patent or test to
any other company. Thus, clinicians have to send all their samples
from patients to Myriad Genetics at a cost of $3000 per test. The
refusal to license means, among other issues, that the test has not
been validated by other researchers.
Bailey, supra note 31.
128
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 163.
129
. McClure, supra note 18.
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limiting access to information by independent researchers.
This, in turn, may lead to diminished work quality or no work
at all.
To the extent non-profit institutions are the wellspring of early
stage innovation and most of them operate on very tight research
budgets, any roadblocks to the easy access to research tools,
whether they involve money or time or, perhaps most significantly,
intellectual collaboration, can serve to retard innovation. That said,
the number of documented instances are few, since it is a classic
case of proving the negative. How can you quantify what hasn’t
happened?130

Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that there is,
to some degree, a “tragedy of the anticommons,” but that
patents, as set forth in the Constitution, remain fundamental
to research and development.
B. THE IMPACT
LITIGATION

ON

BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH

OF

CURRENT LEGISLATION

AND

In an effort to recognize the problems arising under the
current patent system while at the same time recognizing
the importance of patent law, in the fall of 2007 Congress
decided to act.131 “High patent quality is essential to
continued innovation. Litigation abuses, especially ones
committed by those who thrive on low quality patents,
impede the promotion of the progress of science and the
useful arts. Thus, we must act quickly during the 110th
Congress to maintain the integrity of the patent system.” 132
The legislation would impact patent litigation through a
variety of changes, including available damages, venue
requirements, interlocutory appeals, and best mode
requirements.133 It would reform the patent office by
130

. E-mail from Merril Goozner, Dir., Integrity in Sci., Ctr. for Sci. in the
Pub. Interest, to Caroline Crenshaw, J.D. Candidate, Univ. of Minn. (Jan. 9,
2008, 11:49:00 EST) (on file with author).
131
. Bloomberg News, supra note 23.
132
. Statement of Representative Howard L. Berman of California on The
Patent Reform Act of April 18, 2007, http://www.house.gov/list/press/ca28_
berman/statement_berman_patent.doc (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
133
. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
Note: The House approved H.R. 1908 on Sept. 7, 2007, but in April, 2008,
the key Senate sponsor, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) declared the
legislation “dead” for the 110th Congress. Eileen McDermott, End of the
Road for US Patent Reform Bill, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., May 12, 2008,
available at http://www. managingip.com/Article/1930563/End-of-the-roadfor-US-patent-reform-bill. html.
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awarding patents to the inventor that files first, rather than
the first inventor, and by allowing third party review of
patent applications.134
The House Bill and the Senate Bill diverge, though,135
highlighting the lack of consensus regarding how to solve
the current patent debate.136 Although the House considered
industry groups’ perspectives, 137 the legislation remains
contentious. For example, the Biotechnology Industry
Organi-zation (BIO)138 approved some recent changes, but,
believing the damages provision will deter innovation,
refuses to support the bill.139
While the proposed legislative changes seem necessary
and, indeed, may improve the current patent system, the
134

. Id.
. See Kathi Lutton & Kelly Hunsaker, Patent Reform Act of 2007:
House Bill Passes!, FISH AND RICHARDSON PATENT REFORM UPDATE (Sep. 7,
2007),available at http://www.fr.com/news/2007/Sept/Patent%20Reform
%20 Pres%20Sept%2007.pdf (describing the differences between the
House and Senate versions of the patent reform act).
136
. “It’s not a perfect solution. This bill is the beginning of a process. I
am open to suggestions for amending the language to improve its efficacy
or rectify any unintended consequences.” Statement of Rep. Berman,
supra note 132.
137
. See id. (listing industry groups involved as well as various proposals
and suggestions presented to Congress).
138
.
BIO represents more than 1,100 biotechnology companies,
academic institutions, state biotechnology centers, and related
organizations across the United States and 31 other nations. BIO
members are involved in the research and development of
healthcare,
agricultural,
industrial
and
environmental
biotechnology products. BIO also produces the annual BIO
International Convention, the global event for biotechnology.
Statement of Jim Greenwood, BIO president and CEO, Bio Expresses
Concern with Patent Reform Legislation As Reported out of House Judiciary
Committee
(July
19,
2007)
http://bio.org/news/newsitem.asp?
id=2007_0719_01 (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
139
.We remain concerned, however, with provisions in the
legislation that would change how damages against patent
infringers are calculated, in a way that would often make
infringement cheaper. We also believe changes are required to the
provision that would require that courts peel away from the
patented and infringed invention the value of all previously known
elements and award damages based solely on the remaining
elements. This provision severely devalues all underlying patent
rights and could seriously undermine the incentive to develop
novel new forms of medicines and other biotechnologies. Further,
the bill continues to contain broad new rulemaking authority for the
PTO, which is of great concern to BIO.
135
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impact on biotechnology is unclear.140 Increased difficulty
obtaining patents and third party review might increase the
cost and length of the process itself, thereby failing to
reduce the cost of obtaining and licensing patents for
“downstream” research. The limited damages provision
might forestall litigation, increasing the use of patented
material downstream, but that might increase the ability to
infringe upon legitimate patents. In light of the uncertain
impact of legislation on patents in biotechnology, legislators
must consider, and the courts must interpret, all current and
future legislation in light of public policy considerations.141 It
would be prudent to focus on the measure’s over-all impact
on medicine and patients, rather than narrow input to the
views of IP lawyers and pharmaceutical CEOs, who have
“vociferously argued that their ability to compete
internationally depends on the full panoply of current
intellectual property rights.”142 One key to such focus is the
plight of the private, non-profit, research institutions. These
clinics—a crucial subset of the nation’s medical research
community, treating the general public, legislators,
attorneys, and foreign dignitaries—are neither quintessential
businesses nor purely charitable foundations. Rather, as
discussed below in subsection D(1) their structure could be
termed quasi-business.143 If the patent problem is solved for
the non-profit institutions, which develop innovative
technology through their own research efforts, Congress and
the courts will likely have found a balance among the
business, the science, and the medical interests subject to
biotech patent law.

C. ANALYSIS
LITIGATION.

OF

NON-PROFITS MIGHT IMPACT PUBLIC POLICY, LEGISLATION,

AND

To find a solution to the impasse, lawyers, researchers,
courts and legislatures should, as Peter Lee did, think
“outside the box.” In terms of medical research, the
overarching purpose of developing new gene therapies and
new drugs is to serve patients’ needs. In the discussion of
Id.
140
141
142
143

.
.
.
.

See Barfield & Calfee, supra note 25.
Id.
Id.
McClure, supra note 18.
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the “tragedy of the anticommons” in biotech patent law, the
patient is forgotten.144 The focus aims solely at increasing
the research quantitatively.145 Encouraging research,
although an important public policy concern, does not
outweigh the needs of the doctors and patients, although
some legal experts do not believe patients are the major
concern.146 However, when a product affects a sick or dying
person, rather than a retail consumer or a widget, additional
factors should be considered in legislation and court
review.147 Congress and the courts should consider that:
In healthcare, physicians are required to treat patients based on
“standard of care,” which usually means providing the latest and
best medicine. This may mean employing something that is already
available or something that has just recently appeared in the
literature as possibly useful. Neither the physician nor the patient
really has any choice in this. This lack of choice is due to many
factors, including our culture of (good quality) life at all cost,
malpractice litigation fears, and no informed discussion as a
country on how we really want our health care dollars spent. All of
these contribute to this sense of “no practical choice” for
physicians and patients. Without choice in the equation, and a
huge supply of sick people, frequently desperate and not even
thinking rationally, whoever controls the needed healthcare
commodities essentially has no limits on their market – the market
economy fails entirely.148

1. Why Research Institutions are Ignored, but Still Important
The private, non-profit research hospitals and institutions
located throughout the United States appear to be neglected
because they are unique—providing both daily patient care
and biotech research. Institutions such as the Mayo Clinic,
the Cleveland Clinic, ARUP Laboratories, and Johns Hopkins
Health and Medicine Center, among others, are hybrids—
144

. E-mail from Rebecca Eisenberg, Robert and Barbara Luciano
Professor of Law, Univ. of Mich., to Caroline Crenshaw, J.D. Candidate, Univ.
of Minn. (Jan 11, 2008, 10:28:00 EST) (on file with author) (“I don’t know of
any research focusing on private nonprofit research institutions and it
sounds like it would be interesting to pursue . . . . I would not expect them
to differ from other patent holders with respect to the impact of their
patents on patients . . . .”).
145
. “The current innovation system encourages researchers to patent
and commercialize discoveries that in an earlier era were considered basic
science insights. This has led to an active market in the building blocks of
further research.” Goozner, supra note 20, at 0612.
146
. Eisenberg, supra note 144.
147
. See Lab. Corp. of Am., 126 S. Ct. at 2922 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
148
. McClure, supra note 18.
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part business, part pharmaceutical company, part university
and part hospital—they are neither pharmaceutical
companies, small start-up firms, nor universities (although
some of them are attached to universities).149 Since profit is
fundamental to funding quality facilities, doctors’ salaries,
and research, these enterprises must act like businesses;
patient fees and patenting discoveries become financial
necessities. Any pecuniary gain, though, is funneled back
into the hospital.150 For example, “Mayo Clinic’s diversified
activities include health information publishing enterprises,
clinical
laboratory
reference
services,
technology
commercialization, and other services and products that use
Mayo’s medical and scientific knowledge base. These
diversified activities generated $35 million in 2006, which is
reinvested in Mayo Clinic programs in medical research and
education.”151
Similarly, these clinics and labs act like pharmaceutical
corporations in that they patent their discoveries and
research tools in an effort to protect their research from
exploitation. These institutions also are like universities.
Their research is designed to further intellectual curiosity
and develop new technologies for patient care. Their general
mission is wide dissemination of all possible research.152 Still,
under the current patent system, such freedom of
information is clearly tempered by legal departments and a
fear of litigation. For example, at the Cleveland Clinic:
Cleveland Clinic Foundation Innovations was founded in 2000 to
promote innovation and expand treatment of the sick through the
deployment of Cleveland Clinic technology. CCF Innovations
commercializes new technologies developed at Cleveland Clinic,
translating emerging therapies, devices and diagnostics into
beneficial medical products through spin-off companies, licenses
and equity partnerships. Under Cleveland Clinic conflict of interest
policies, these transactions are subject to review in advance by
independent physician and trustee conflict of interest committees
149

. See generally The Mayo Clinic, http://www.mayoclinic.com/ (last
visited Nov. 4, 2007); The Cleveland Clinic, http://www.clevelandclinic.org/
(last visited Nov. 4, 2007); ARUP Laboratories, http://www.aruplab.com/
(last
visited
Nov.
4,
2007);
Johns
Hopkins
Medicine.
http://www.hopkinsmedicine. org/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2007) (each
describing the institutions, the patient care and the product and research
developments).
150
. MAYO CLINIC, supra note 2, at 52.
151
. Id.
152
. See McClure, supra note 18.
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to ensure that they are ethical and consistent with Cleveland Clinic
policies and legal requirements. In addition, use of these products
in clinical trials is subject to approval. Use of these medical
products by Cleveland Clinic once they are commercialized is also
subject to conflict of interest review.153

Although arguably non-profit research institutions need
not fear litigation from pharmaceutical corporations and/or
start-up biotech firms because of the patient-oriented nature
of their work, this argument is not persuasive. Large, wellknown, and well-funded, non-profit research institutions
have faced complex litigation over patent infringement.154
Unlike start-up businesses, which are underfunded and use
relatively small numbers of patented materials, the large
institutions, because they are well-known, and because they
use numerous research tools, are a prime target for patent
infringement suits. Like large businesses, the likelihood of
damage awards, even though the institutions are non-profit,
is high.
Non-profits also suffer because “government funded
discoveries that pharmaceutical companies and universities
feed off of is actually really cheap in most cases because the
labor costs are almost free. This is because grad students do
much of the grunt work.”155 Finally the non-profits, because
they are private, do not enjoy state university sovereign
immunity protections. State universities, it seems, have a
significant and unfair advantage in the patent litigation
game.
In summary, the private, non-profit research institutions
do not belong in the previously examined categories
affected by the “tragedy of the anticommons” and patent
law. Their hybrid business system—research guided by
patient care—is both served and hurt by the current patent
system. While patents bring in money from innovative
techniques, the licensing agreements are expensive and
time consuming for doctors. Nonetheless, the difficulties in
obtaining patents are unlikely to halt research at these
clinics, since research is the lifeblood of their exceptional
patient care. The non-profit clinics will simply hire more
153

. Cleveland Clinic, About Us: Integrity in Innovation, http://www.
clevelandclinic.org/aboutus/integrity.htm (last visited Oct. 27, 2007).
154
. See generally Scripps Clinic & Research Found. v. Genetech, 927
F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir 1991); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119
F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
155
. McClure, supra note 18.
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lawyers to ensure the legality of all patents, both developed
and utilized. Conversely, start-ups and small businesses
could well be forced out-of-business by patent costs. The
ultimate impact of these added costs and delays, though, is
on patients, who need care, and doctors involved in
diagnoses and treatment. Doctors, who might be able to
develop a cure or drug for a patient relatively quickly by
changing minute aspects of some research tools to
correspond with patient needs, now are forced to delay their
research, pending patent review. Ultimately, non-profits
suffer from the hybrid status:
Because good patient care requires a good interaction between the
science and the clinic, it is not surprising that these hybrid models
(such as Mayo and the others) are considered the best providers of
medical care in the country. It is difficult to do only part of the
whole medical field in isolation and do it well. In some specific
areas of medical testing, the result is that much of the clinical
testing, particularly the esoteric testing that includes much of the
genetic testing embroiled in the patent issues, is actually
concentrated in relatively few centers in the United States.
Although patients may see their doctors in their home town, their
specimens often travel to one of a few centers for testing. So, there
are relatively few places footing the bill back to the businesses for
their license fees/royalties and it is not distributed evenly across
medical care providers. The providers who are subjected to the
potential or real litigation will pass these costs back to the patients/
health care system. This situation is damaging for patients, as it
makes the costs for the hybrid institutions appear higher. Some
health care insurers will choose cheaper testing facilities, which
have not spent the time and money in quality and integrated
results. Whenever substandard care is given to patients, it
ultimately costs more (unnecessary or wrong tests and treatments,
law suits). It is for these reasons that the good hybrid institutions
can survive despite the odds against them—quality is always more
cost effective in the end. But patients caught up in the
inefficiencies and poor care resulting from the apparent cost
inequities triggered, in large part, by these patent issues, pay
extra.156

It would behoove NIH, academics, special interest
groups, Congress, and the courts to consider this aspect of
the patent problem. In the interest of public policy, patients
at non-profit research institutions should not be harmed
while universities and start-up biotech firms receive
government funding and large corporations raise prices on

156

. Id.
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D. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
The courts have recognized that the patent process is
long and expensive.158 To improve the process and to
promote the timely entrance of generic drugs into the
market upon expiration of the patented name-brand drug,
the courts allow the use of some upstream patented
materials in the research and development process in
accordance with the safe harbor provision.159 Yet, the
experimental use exception for both universities and private
research institutions is severely limited.160 Consequently,
while the Patent and Trademark Office is adjudicating
patentable material and Congress is trying to find a balance
between costs, timeliness, and innovation, the courts, at
least in the realm of biotechnology, seem to be exacerbating
the public policy problem and costing patients time and
money.
By expanding the experimental use exception, which has
been suggested but deemed dangerous to innovation, 161 the
courts would help protect patients at private, non-profit
research institutions. Since the courts opted to allow state
universities to continue patent infringement without liability,
it would make sense for the courts to consider allowing nonprofit institutions the advantage of an experimental use
exception. Doctors could use materials without the fear of
liability and cost of obtaining patented research tools.
Further, it is unlikely that such exceptions would deter any
research of these tools. While the tools would not provide
financial incentives themselves, end products would still be
patentable. Since the research tools are necessary for
achieving the end product, it is unlikely that innovation of
these tools would cease significantly.162 Also, if an end
157

. Id.
. United States Patent and Trademark Office, Answers to the most
frequently asked kids’ questions about patents, trademarks and copyrights
and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, USPTO Kid’s Page,
http://www.uspto. gov/web/offices/ac/ahrpa/opa/kids/kidprimer.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2007).
159
. See Integra Lifesciences, 545 U.S. at 202.
160
. See Madey, 307 F.ed. 1351 at 1363.
161
. Mireles, supra note 4, at 214–16.
162
.Research liability for patent infringement: In light of the
Federal Circuit’s 2002 ruling that even noncommercial scientific
158
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product ultimately succeeded and proliferated, the
companies could ask for royalties. Therefore, the courts
should consider fostering a new relationship between patent
use and biotechnology. This new balance must consider the
large number of patients served and the purpose of the nonprofit research institutions, which are seemingly ignored in
the “tragedy of the anticommons” debate. Leading research
institutions serving more than 500,000 patients annually
should be able to treat all patients at the lowest possible
costs.163 Increased patient costs lead to increased insurance
rates, which ultimately impact society at large, not just the
patients visiting these institutions. It seems logical, then, to
consider the needs of these institutions when establishing a
new course for the patent system.
Another popular suggestion that seems possible for the
courts to utilize on behalf of non-profit, medical research
facilities is the oft-discussed patent pool. Multinational
companies like IBM, Sony and Nokia are attempting to set up
a patent pool “for companies to donate intellectual property
that improves the environment.”164 In this patent pool each
company will donate patents to the pool, which can be
research enjoys no protection from patent infringement liability,
and in view of the academic research community’s belief in the
existence of such an exemption, and behavior accordingly, there
should be some level of protection for noncommercial uses of
patented inventions. Congress should consider appropriately
narrow legislation, but if progress is slow or delayed the Office of
Management and Budget and the federal government agencies
sponsoring research should consider extending ‘authorization and
consent’ to grantees as well as contractors, provided that such
rights are strictly limited to research and do not extend to any
resulting commercial products or services. Either legislation or
administrative action could help ensure preservation of the
‘commons’ required for scientific and technological progress.
A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21 CENTURY 82 (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds.) (2004).
163
.Unlike software or even agricultural biotechnology—where the
end products are relatively low cost, and the costs of development
are relatively evenly distributed throughout the development
process—biomedical research costs escalate once a therapeutically
useful product reaches clinical trials. Applied research can take five
to ten years from the start of human safety experiments. While the
costs of pharmaceutical research are less than the drug industry
claims, the investment required can run into the tens of even
hundreds of millions of dollars. As a result this developmental
research has almost always been funded by the private sector.
Goozner, supra note 20, at 0613.
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ST. J., Jan. 14, 2008 at B2.
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utilized without regard to patent liability. “We’re pledging
that we won’t assert the patents that are put into the
commons against anyone who is using them in an
environmentally friendly way.”165 Major corporations are
working together to advocate for the environment and
solving problems through varying patent schemes. A similar
device could help biotechnology research.
The federal government also might be able to intervene
for non-profits if it recognizes the problems at these
institutions. For example, as the government seeks to
protect the public from the Avian Flu, it has forced
pharmaceutical companies to sell some exclusive patents
and allow other corporations to develop and market a flu
vaccine.166 The government issued “compulsory licenses to
other drug companies to manufacture generic versions of
the drug. Such option is available to countries under the
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS)
Agreement, a component of the treaties that created the
World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.”167 The
government, then, has the power to ensure that there is
enough vaccine and that it is affordable to citizens in the
United States and abroad. If it addresses the non-profit
problem, the government might find a similar solution for
non-profit research institutions and ease some of their
patent law and biotech research problems. Finally, the Court
could re-evaluate its definition of patentable material and
fashion a clear definition for patentable biological materials.

CONCLUSION
There is a significant amount of research and legislation
regarding the balance between patent law and innovation.
While most industries simply pass along the costs of
protecting innovation to the consumers, who can choose to
purchase the product or not, the biotechnology field differs.
In terms of pharmaceutical corporations, doctors and
hospitals can choose to buy new, innovative drugs or use old
ones. Patients, however, who seek out new treatments and
state-of-the-art care and procedures, particularly patients at
the private, non-profit institutions, are often suffering from
165
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life-threatening illnesses. These patients have no alternative
choices; they rely on the expensive techniques used at these
clinics. Unfortunately, prices are rising at these clinics
because of increased patent protection and decreased
freedom of information. The courts are limiting exceptions
that these institutions historically relied upon to avoid
passing on costs to patients. Congress is changing the
patent laws, but it appears to be ignoring the non-profit
research institutions and their patients.
In a society where innovation and technological change
continue unabated, but where medical costs continue to
skyrocket, it is necessary to review the nation’s patent laws
and their impact on biotechnology from a perspective other
than that of the pharmaceutical companies and patent
attorneys. Doctors, who are busy caring for patients and
developing treatments, have little time to propose new
patent laws, but they need to be consulted. Costs and delays
incurred by patients must be quantified. Private institutions
must suggest policy changes, such as limiting the amount of
time a diagnostic approach is protected under patent law,
without being subject to criticism from pharmaceutical
companies, start-up groups, universities, and academics.
Although NIH has performed a few studies that focus on
the problem, the nation would benefit from a closer look at
the number of patients harmed, how much costs have
increased, and the number of doctors and researchers at
these research institutions who have been frustrated as a
result of the current patent system. The negative impact on
patients may ultimately prove less severe than thought, but
it is clear that patent law in biotechnology is different from
patent law in other fields. Policies, laws, and court
interpretations
in
biotechnological
research
and
development need to evolve and take into consideration the
public at large, rather than simply the impact on innovation.
It is unlikely that the writers of the Constitution foresaw
modern health care techniques. It seems equally unlikely
that the Constitutional protection for innovation and
commercialization in capitalist markets was meant to punish
patients and limit health care quality and accessibility.

